How do you know if someone is a pilot?

They will tell you.

As aviators we like to let everyone know, not only our own ability but that of our airplanes. We are proud of our dispatch reliability rate, the utility they afford, the ease of travel, and the time saved not standing in a TSA line. And we would love to tell you all about it in great detail.

And yet, for all that talk, we don’t always communicate very well with our passengers when describing risk. We don’t want to scare the deer. Or show our airplane’s shortcomings. Or our own.

But, yes, our little airplanes really do offer up all that utility. Add a Garmin suite of avionics to the already reliable powerplant/airframe in my highly updated Bonanza, and I can get in and out of places that no commercial airliner could ever attempt.

Part 91 takes away whatever remaining restrictions the majors have in getting off the ground. Technically, we GA pilots can take off in any conditions we like. Sure, we don’t necessarily do it, but we all know that we could if we wanted to badly enough. And that’s simply not a helpful framework for our self-deluding primate brains.

• READ MORE: Misses, Near and Far…

I remember once getting a call some years ago on a Saturday morning from my buddy, Dave. He and a friend had to make a wedding in California’s Bay Area that night. Their commercial flight into KSFO was canceled because of fog. He asked me if I could get them to a nearby airport in the next few hours. A part of my brain lit up at the thought of saving the day. It’s fun being the hero. I tried to remain calm and even had the wherewithal to tell him I had to check the weather first. But my mind was already 87 percent made up. I was getting them to that wedding.

Turns out it wasn’t just fog. There was a well-developed low making a ton of rain along with 70 knot winds at 10,000 feet. We flew right through that storm. While there was no convection, and I wasn’t exactly in over my head, it was not a flight that needed to happen. I had just received my instrument rating a few months earlier and was determined to leverage it to its full potential.

I remember this one moment up at altitude when I realized the weather at our destination was not going to lift above minimums. I told the guys we would not make San Jose and would have to land at Monterey. They were concerned with rental cars and ground transportation, blissfully unaware I had not studied our alternate’s instrument approaches—there are six of them at KMRY. Runway 28 was active, and it required a descent toward mountainous terrain and an approach that takes you right past peaks higher than the aircraft’s path. The surrounding terrain there is the real deal, having taken the life of a well-known CFI who had a CFIT accident in 2021 while departing into IMC.

Our flight ended with a successful landing, but I will always remember walking away from the airplane toward the FBO when Dave asked me if I always sweated this much when flying. “Yes,” I replied. “I’m a ‘schvitzer.’” Better that than explain to him that I exposed them both to a much higher risk without ever giving them the option to make a choice for themselves. Had I called Dave back earlier that morning and explained that our desired destination was at minimums and our alternate had mountainous terrain surrounding it on three sides, he might very well have decided making the wedding wasn’t that important after all. More than 50 percent of marriages end in divorce, anyway. But I never gave him that option. I wanted to make it work—for me, as much as for him. And that’s a problem.

In the end, I didn’t even achieve the hero status that was fueling my decision-making process. The guys were scrambling to find a rental car as they tossed a thank-you over their shoulders as they walked to the FBO. I slowly made my way back to the airplane and just sat there in the left seat for a bit and breathed before filing and heading back to LA.

The best example of this noncommunication was also the worst day of my life: that fateful morning in Telluride, Colorado, where I encountered wind shear on takeoff and almost entered a stall/spin, ending with a gear-up landing. My passenger and I could have left later that day or the next morning. That’s when all the “reasons” start flooding in:

• The hotel room in Santa Fe, New Mexico, is booked.
• The restaurant reservation is made.
• The girl is new to me, and I want to impress her.
• My airplane is perfectly suited to the mission.
• I am a pilot of exceptional, bordering superhuman ability.

In hindsight, those seem patently absurd (the last, also being patently false) with the reality I was then served: a totaled airplane, a scarred pilot and his dog, and a woman who ended up being subjected to a terrifying, near-death experience.

Had I just asked her if she was willing to risk the flight at one of the most notoriously dangerous airports in North America because of mountain wind shear and a climbing density altitude, I can almost guarantee she would have declined. But that dialogue never occurred, because I never opened it.

There are times where we really don’t see the danger coming and, as such, a conversation cannot be had. For that, there is no remedy. But I find the vast majority of the time there is that tingling feeling that originates in your brain then migrates south to the back of your neck, where it surfaces, becoming almost topical—like an itch.

We almost always know. We just don’t always listen, and we often don’t speak.

This column first appeared in the September 2023/Issue 941 of FLYING’s print edition.

The post Pilots Don’t Always Communicate Well When Describing Risk appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

The NTSB recently released a video of a panel discussion about the 2021 accident involving a Challenger 605 attempting a circle to land approach at Truckee-Tahoe Airport (KTRK), in Truckee, California, that resulted in the deaths of the flight crew, six passengers, and two dogs. The probable cause of the accident was released in August of this year and listed as a combination of an unstabilized approach and the flight crew’s poor crew resource management and decision making. The panel discussion took the event apart step by step to identify the issues and suggest ways to mitigate these risks.

The panel was led by NTSB board member Michael Graham. The participants included Stephen Stein, NTSB senior accident investigator of the Truckee event, Richard Meikle, executive vice president for operations and safety at Flight Safety International, Scott Snow, head of training and performance at CAE Incorporated, and three Part 135 operators, Stephen Myers, executive vice president of Elite Jets, Jeff Baum, founder and CEO of Wisconsin Aviation, and Patrick McGuire, representing commercial and business aviation safety management.

The discussion began with a review of the accident, which took place on July 26, 2021. The accident occurred in the daytime, but visibility was somewhat compromised as there was smoke in the air because of forest fires.

• READ MORE: NTSB Says Poor Decisions to Blame in Fatal Business Jet Accident

Per the 26-page NTSB report, the captain and first officer were flying a Part 135 flight fromCoeur d’Alene, Idaho, to Truckee. According to Stein, the captain was employed by Aeolus Air Charter, Inc. a Part 135 operator. The first officer was a contract pilot hired through a website. The captain had recently undergone recurrency training with the employer. It was noted that the first officer had not undergone this company training, and it was the first time they had flown together. There were references to the FO helping the captain with programming the flight management system.

According to Airnav.com, the airport elevation is 5,904 feet and the airport has two runways: Runway 11/29, measuring 7,001 by100 feet, and Runway 2/20, measuring 4,654 by 75 feet.

The cockpit voice recorder captured the flight, the crew discussing and briefing the straight-in approach to Runway 11. The NTSB report notes that most of the flight was uneventful until descent, when air traffic control told the flight crew to expect the RNAV GPS approach for Runway 20.

The captain was pilot flying and the FO was pilot monitoring the flight. Both determined that Runway 20 was too short for Challenger at its expected landing weight. The report states “Instead of making a request to ATC for the straight-in approach to Runway 11 (the longer runway), the captain told the FO they could take the Runway 20 approach and circle to land on Runway 11, and the FO relayed this information to ATC. ATC approved, and the flight crew accepted the circle-to-land approach.”

Although the descent checklist required that the flight crew brief the new circle-to-land approach, as the flight crew’s acceptance of the new approach invalidated the previous straight-in approach brief, the crew failed to brief the new approach.

The situation deteriorated from there as both the pilot and copilot were behind the airplane until it stalled short of the runway and off the centerline, resulting in a fireball that was caught on a hotel security camera.

“Briefing the approach gives you a chance to get a shared mental model between the flight crew members,” said Stein, noting that the FO at one point asked how they were going to get down from 15,000 feet to 12,000 feet in 2 nautical miles, adding that the aircraft was at 250 knots, which was too fast as they needed to be below 230 knots for the circle to land.

It was noted that ATC instructed the flight crew to hold, but “the captain was slow in complying with this instruction, so the FO started the turn to enter the holding pattern and then informed ATC once they were established in the hold.”

Approximately 20 seconds later, ATC cleared them for the approach. Before the FO confirmed the clearance with ATC, he asked the captain if he was ready for the approach, and the captain stated that he was. However, the aircraft was still too fast. The FO suggested a 360 degree turn to the captain, but the captain never acknowledged the excessive airspeed and did not turn.

The FO continued to coach the captain. Upon visual identification of the airport, the FO instructed the captain to make a turn 90 degrees to the right to put the airplane on an approximate heading of 290 degrees, which would put the aircraft parallel to Runway 11. According to the NTSB, this was consistent with the manufacturer’s operating manual procedures for the downwind leg of the circling approach.

However, the FO instructed the captain to roll out of the turn prematurely, and the captain stopped the turn on a heading of about 233 degrees which resulted in the aircraft on a 57 degree angle left of the downwind course parallel with Runway 11 and what the NTSB described as “an unnecessarily tight turning radius.”

When the aircraft began the turn to final, the airplane was still about 1.3 nm from the maximum circling radius that was established for the airplane’s approach category.The break down in cockpit communication and command structure continued, as the FO deployed 45 degrees of flaps after confirming with the captain although the manufacturer’s operating manual procedures for the downwind leg called for a flap setting of 30 degrees.

The aircraft was at 162 knots, approximately 44 knots above the landing speed of 118 knots that the crew had calculated and planned on earlier in the flight. The FO addressed this by telling the captain, “I’m gonna get your speed under control for you.”

Investigators noted that at this point it appeared as though the throttles were reduced as the engine fan speeds (N1) began to decrease from about 88 percent to about 28 percent. As the aircraft slowed, the FO repeatedly attempted to point out the airport to the captain, who appeared to be having difficulty seeing the runway – possibly due to the wildfire smoke in the area.

The FO continued to coach and reassure the captain through the circle-to-land until they entered the base leg when the FO repeatedly asked for control of the aircraft. There was no verbalized positive exchange of controls.

The jet crossed the extended centerline in a left bank and the FO remarked they were still too high. At this point one of the pilots fully deployed the flight spoilers, which increased the airplane’s sink rate. The airspeed now dropped to 135 knots, which was 17 knots above the Vref speed based on what the NTSB called “the erroneous basic operating weight programmed into the airplane’s flight management system.

The bank angle increased and the stall protection system (SPS) stick shaker and stick pusher engaged. The captain asked the FO, “What are you doing?” and the FO repeatedly asked the captain to let him have the airplane. The stick shaker and stick pusher briefly disengaged, then engaged again as the aircraft entered a rapid roll to the left consistent with a left wing stall resulting in an impact with terrain and post crash fire.

Failure to Brief

As noted in the panel discussion, the issues began with the crew’s failure to brief the circling approach. Although the FO repeatedly pointed out the aircraft was too high and too fast, the captain did not act upon this information. Because the aircraft was too fast, they did not have the time to configure the airplane and make corrections, thus reducing the safety margin.

As noted in the report, “The circling approach maneuver began at 160 kts, which was 20 kts higher than the upper limit of the circle-to-land approach speed established for this airplane’s approach category (category C) and did not drop below the category C maximum speed until the flight crew was preparing to start their base leg turn.”

It was suggested based on the conversations in the cockpit per the voice recorder that the crew did not recognize the severity of the situation and the FO was trying to salvage the approach, resulting in numerous preventable safety challenges.

What We Can Take Away From This

There are a number of lessons to be learned from this event. (Puts on flight instructor cap). For starters, be wary when flying with someone unfamiliar to you. At the airline level, pilots undergo the same training so, in theory, they understand what is expected of them during the flight and know how to work together as a crew. The role of crew members and communication of expectations have been taught and rehearsed in the simulator.

The panelists noted that when an individual undergoing training has difficulties in any of these areas, they are counseled and retrained—or removed, if the situation warrants it.

The standards of performance need to be respected and enforced, starting at the flight school level, and before each flight the CFI needs to verbalize expectations with the learner. Sadly, this often doesn’t happen because the CFI is there for their hours, not necessarily to teach—that one-off flight adds to their logbook, and the learner becomes “someone else’s problem” when the instructor moves on. This must not continue. Some CFIs are reluctant to address the learner’s shortcomings for fear of hurting their feelings or losing a client. If you choose your words carefully, you can help the client. Lying to them about their performance or using vague language like “You did okay” doesn’t help anyone one, and sets them up for a larger failure down the road.

If the instructor introduces the airman certification standards at the beginning of the lesson with the caveat “these are the minimum standards,” it puts in place the metrics for success.

The instructors must make sure the learners understand that these standards and that these metrics are established by the FAA, not the instructor or the flight school—and they are non negotiable.

CRM Training Should Begin Early

The concept of crew resource management (CRM) is a concept introduced in ground school but often not discussed or practiced in the cockpit. This can be addressed once the learner is taught how to use the checklist and perform a passenger briefing.Their job is to fly and if they need the instructor’s assistance or the instructor has to take the controls, that needs to be verbalized with the phrase “my airplane, I have the controls” or “you have the controls” and a positive exchange taking place.

The learner needs to listen to the CFI—and here’s where it gets tricky. If the learner ignores the CFI or locks up on the controls, refusing to let go, the CFIs need to do whatever it takes to get them to release.

This is a delicate area, especially when the learner is larger and physically stronger than the CFI. There may be some learners the CFI refuses to fly with because of this. While most CFIs don’t get into the cockpit with the idea they are going to physically assault the person next to them, I recall the words of my first CFI, a retired police officer who told me, “It is better to talk to twelve than be carried by six,” meaning it is better to have to explain yourself in a court of law than be buried because a learner killed you both in an accident. You do what you have to do, and hope you live to tell the story.

Use the Checklists, Brief the Approaches

The appropriate use of the checklist and a verbal briefing of the approaches should be taught and practiced from day one. When the private pilot candidate is in level flight in the practice area with the CFI at the side, the cruise flight and pre-maneuver checklist should be verbalized.

Before leaving the practice area to return to the airport, the pre-landing and approach checklist with a review of entry into the pattern including appropriate aircraft configuration, altitudes and airspeeds should be reviewed. Far too many private pilots do not follow these procedures, resulting in the “chop, drop, hope you stop (before running out of runway)” approach. Part of this review is a reminder of the sterile cockpit rule before entering the pattern, because this is a task-intensive part of the flight.

In the Truckee accident the copilot was reluctant to assert control when it was obvious that the captain was behind the airplane—for example, when the aircraft was too fast. It is understandable that you don’t want to create conflict in the cockpit, or possibly lose your job, but let’s look at the bigger picture: would you rather talk to twelve or be carried by six?

The post Lessons from the Truckee NTSB Case Study appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

For years, Bob Gardner’s Say Again, Please: A Pilot’s Guide to Radio Communications has been an educational resource for pilots. The seventh edition of the popular book, first published in 1995, has just been released by Aviation Supplies & Academics Inc. The information reflects Gardner’s decades of experience as a flight instructor and designated pilot examiner as he explains how ATC works, and how to ask for what you want or need.

Say Again, Please has been recommended reading for aspiring pilots for the past 28 years. The new edition has been updated to reflect current aircraft equipment, navaids, changes in airspace infrastructure, rules, and procedures.

Gardner’s prose is conversational and concise. You feel as though you are sitting across the table from a favorite instructor as he lays out scenarios and presents typical radio transmissions and appropriate pilot procedures. The book takes the mystery out of pilot-to-controller speak.

This is more than a what-to-say book. Gardner goes into detail explaining how radio equipment works, radio etiquette and rules, the differences between VFR and IFR communications, emergency communications, the role of ATC facilities, and who to call when, as well as differences in procedures in different airspace. There is also a pilot/controller communication section with terms and phrases you will hear and need to use.

Say Again, Please is available in softcover from FBOs, online retailers of asa2fly.com for $24.95.

The book can also be purchased as an e-book viewed on both small and large screens for use with the ASA Library app for $19.95.

For more information, visit asa2fly.com.

The post ‘Say Again, Please’ Remains a Must-Read for Pilots appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

TKM Avionics—which has recently gone out of business—promised a drop-in replacement for the KX 155, and it looked almost exactly like this. It’s almost as if it bought the design and finished it—though that is pure speculation on the part of those who had seen both units.

The radio has an SD card database that will help identify frequencies to help with situational awareness. That’s a welcome feature. Several others include:

• High-resolution color LCD
• 50-channel memory presets
• 25 kilohertz or 8.33 kh channel spacing
• Full-featured digital nav/com with VOR, LOC, ILS, and glide slope
• Compatible with existing indicators and installed equipment
• Compatible with 14- and 28-volt systems
• Possibility to expand capabilities with future Honeywell Anthem cockpit connectivity
• Two-year warranty

Prices vary by installer, but one option is currently available for $4,489 from Pacific Coast Avionics.

“The price is high, but in avoiding an expensive visit with the avionics installer, it could save a bit of labor and a lot of downtime—and downtime is very expensive for operators who need the plane aloft to make money,” according to Plane & Pilot contributor and Mooney owner Jeremy King, who took a good look at the new model during the air show. 

However, King gives at least one caveat: “While it’s advertised as a digital replacement for the KX-155, its outputs are not digital—so while it will work fine with legacy CDIs or HSIs, it won’t play well with instruments that require a digital signal, such as Garmin’s G5.”

The post Honeywell Debuts New KX 200 Nav/Com Radio appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

The companies jointly announced the deal at the Paris Air Show last week at Paris-Le Bourget airport in France.

The Aspire 350 is intended for both forward-fit by the aircraft manufacturer and retrofit on the Falcon F900 and F2000 series, as well as the Falcon 7X, 8X, and upcoming Falcon 6X and 10X. The Aspire 350 targets installation on business jets as well as commercial transport category aircraft and helicopters. It is designed to provide seamless connectivity around the globe—and be easy to install.

• READ MORE: Dassault’s Falcon 6X Completes Flight Test

Honeywell uses the Iridium NEXT satellite constellation to execute this level of connectivity, along with reliability and cost savings. Pilots can also use the Iridium network for safety-related services, while passengers enjoy download speeds up to 704 Kbps on the internet connection. The Aspire 350 gained Iridium certification in May.

“Staying connected is critical to flight safety and efficiency, and we are proud that Dassault has selected the Aspire 350 for its fleet of best-in-class business aircraft,” said Steve Hadden, vice president and general manager, services and connectivity for Honeywell Aerospace. “Honeywell and Dassault’s relationship has now reached its 50th year, and we continue to strengthen this relationship. 

• READ MORE: Dassault Aviation Rolls Out SAF Program At Little Rock Plant

“We are confident that the users of the business aircraft will appreciate the seamless connectivity the Aspire 350 will provide,” Hadden said. “The experience will be like using your broadband at home.”

The post Dassault Chooses Honeywell Aspire 350 for Falcon Fleet appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

Answer: Remember the phrase “aviate, navigate, communicate”? It reminds us that communicating—that is, using the radio—is the last priority in the aircraft. That being said, if an airplane has a working VHF comm radio installed, a handheld radio is a backup device—not a requirement. Pilots, especially those who fly in airspace where radio communication is required (Class A, B, C, and D), often carry handheld radios in their flight bag just in case they have a problem with the aircraft’s electrical system, and/or the radio fails. 

Pilots who fly aircraft without electrical systems, such as Piper J-3 Cubs, often use handheld radios because the ability to hear as well as see traffic can increase safety. Instructors often have a handheld radio so that when they solo their learners, they can keep an ear on them in the traffic pattern. Student pilots may also find a handheld radio helpful when they are learning radio communications, as they can use it to listen to the unicom or tower frequency while studying or hanging out at the airport.

• READ MORE: Can a CFI Applicant Teach Ground School?

Do you have a question about aviation that’s been bugging you? Ask us anything you’ve ever wanted to know about aviation. Our experts in general aviation, flight training, aircraft, avionics, and more may attempt to answer your question in a future article.

The post Is a Handheld Radio Required for Flying? appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

These were the words of a somewhat frustrated tower controller who was trying to understand the request of the Japanese learner—the young man could speak English, but apparently it was so heavily accented (to the controller’s ears), I feared the request for touch and goes came across the radio sounding like something between Scooby Doo and the teacher in the Charlie Brown cartoons.

I quickly repeated the request in my instructor voice and apologized for causing the controller “grief and undue agitation.” With a chuckle, the controller granted the request. Despite the learner’s best efforts, the controller continued to have difficulty interpreting his subsequent radio calls—I took over after the second ‘say again please,’ so we could finish the lesson.

The experience was frustrating. The learner had no trouble flying, and his pilot certificate noted English proficiency—and most people who heard him speak agreed he was. Yet some of the controllers seemed to have trouble understanding him. Was this common? And more importantly, was there a way for us to fix this?

Taking Things Literally

If you hold a pilot certificate issued by the FAA, it bears the notation English Proficient. It doesn’t matter if you were born in the U.S. and English is the only language you know—the FAA wants the language proficiency box checked.

English is the official language of aviation, but there are those who swear American English is a corruption. If you have any experience attempting to communicate in American English in the United Kingdom or Australia, you will see what I mean. 

• READ MORE: FAA’s English Language Standards Leave Gaps for Learners

Aviation English is a language all its own with its plethora of acronyms and verbal shorthand, which, when misinterpreted, can lead to some comical experiences in the aircraft. For example, the pre-landing checklist or “GUMPS check,” as known in the U.S. is known as a “PU—Y check” in Australia. The gentleman who shared this nugget of knowledge with me was in the U.S. on business and wanted to maintain currency—and couldn’t figure out why he got funny looks from the other female CFIs, who often cut the flight short after the first landing. I introduced GUMPS during the flight, and afterwards explained the other word, while not in itself offensive, had been appropriated and was loaded with gender bias. 

Because of aviation shorthand and nuances, language misunderstandings are inevitable. For example, when the controller asks the pilot, “say altitude,” the controller is asking the pilot to state the altitude the aircraft is at—yet some (learner) pilots take the instruction literally and will reply, “altitude.” A variation on this is when the pilot is asked to state their intentions and replies, “I wish to become an airline pilot.” I have heard both in the real world.

Translation, Please?

I admire anyone who can speak multiple languages. I struggled through Spanish in middle school and high school, taking just enough to qualify for college admission—and I cannot imagine being fluent enough to operate in the fast-paced environment of aviation. Your mind has to work overtime.

• READ MORE: Visa Rule Changes Enhance Flight Training Options for International Students

For the most part, the learner hears what the controller or instructor is asking, translates it into their native language in their head, processes the question, comes up with the answer, then translates it back into English for their response. This process can put you behind the aircraft.

In the case of the Japanese learner, he understood what was being asked and knew what to say, and he said it, but his accent was apparently confusing to the controllers. I was perplexed, because I could understand him, but then I had been flying with him for the better part of a month. I surmised that I had learned to understand him.

I shared the experience of my Japanese learner with a friend who is an air traffic controller in the Midwest. She is also a flight instructor, so she could approach the challenge from both sides. She shared a story of a time she gave a clearance at a rapid pace to a man who asked her to say again—he spoke with a southern drawl, telling her that the pace he was speaking at was also the pace he listened at. She slowed down to repeat the clearance, matching his cadence, enabling him to copy his clearance. Perhaps if the learner parroted the accent and pace of the controller?

One day we received a clearance mid-flight that was rapid fire. The learner shook his head, letting me know he didn’t think he could read it back—and we were about to be handed off to the tower, so time was of the essence. He gestured to me that I should do the honors. I detected a bit of a southern accent from the controller, so I gave the readback in my best imitation of Sandra Bullock in The Blind Side. The readback was correct, and in subsequent transmissions, the controller matched my cadence.

The learner’s eyes lit up—he obviously had an ‘Ah ha!’ moment. When the next radio call came, he held up his hand, letting me know he had it. He replied in what I think was supposed to be an impersonation of John Wayne, but it was more like Robin Williams’ impersonation of John Wayne—whatever, I wasn’t going to quibble—and it worked. The controller understood the learner, and two-way communication was established.

The rest of the flight went without a hitch—I think the controller recognized we had a breakthrough, because when the learner made his final call leaving the airspace, the controller replied, “See you later, Pancho.”

Learning had taken place—for all of us.

The post Training in the ‘English Proficient’ World appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

The news comes as the Part 135 operator also expanded its partnership with SmartSky Network, the fast-growing air-to-ground (ATG) inflight connectivity provider. During the  2022 National Business Aviation Association’s Business Aviation Convention and Exhibition (NBAA-BACE) held in Orlando last week, the companies teamed up to display SmartSky’s latest technology onboard a flyExclusive jet, following the installation of the ATG hardware on a series of Cessna Citation Xs at flyExclusive’s facilities in Kinston, North Carolina.

In a joint interview with FLYING, the CEOs of both companies discussed their partnership, the expectation of inflight connectivity, and, broadly, flyExclusive’s planned IPO.

New Trends in Inflight Connectivity

Jim Segrave, founder and CEO at flyExclusive said one reason it was important to work with SmartSky was that the company has “delivered dependable and secure connectivity that not only enhances the passenger experience, which offers the ability to live stream and conduct high-quality video calling but also provides real-time data transfer to and from the aircraft.”

SmartSky’s CEO Dave Helfgott said that is in part because the company has engaged in connectivity research, funding, and building a network for nearly a decade. Then the pandemic came along, private aircraft sales boomed, and SmartSky was a direct benefactor of customer demand for Wi-Fi on board.

Helfgott explained that as the work-from-anywhere trend advanced and more people got access to private aviation, the idea of Wi-Fi not being on board was less of a question. Segrave agreed—”The expectation of whether or not you have it is 100 percent. If you don’t have it—they don’t want to charter your plane.”

Then, on top of that, is reliability.

“It’s amazing how upset customers get if the [Wi-Fi onboard] doesn’t work,” Segrave explained. “They’re bent out of shape. So, reliability is a big factor for us.”

Is Gogo losing its Spot?

To be fair, FlyExclusive already had another Wi-Fi provider on board some of the other aircraft in its fleet through Gogo, the market leader in ATG solutions. Yet, when it started to add SmartSky’s solutions to its jets in March, it meant replacing some of Gogo’s antennae from some of the FlyExclusive aircraft.

Assuredly, it also marked another chapter in a contentious relationship between SmartSky and Gogo. In February, SmartSky sued Gogo, alleging that Gogo’s 5G product infringed on four SmartSky patents. Though that issue is sorted out, Segrave said the change was just to diversify the business. 

“Instead of having all your eggs in one basket, let’s diversify,” Segrave said. “What SmartSky is doing is exciting to me, directionally, and I think the industry needs what they’re providing, which is some other service.”

How Does Starlink Compare?

So how does SmartSky make its service reliable, and what does it think about new market entrants like Elon Musk’s Starlink satellite offering disrupting the market?

“There’s no one pure-play solution,” Helfgott said. “Satellites are good at broadcasting data. So, if you want to get a lot of bandwidth to an aircraft, and it’s a big aircraft—because it needs larger antennas—in that case, satellites are a good idea.” However, Helfgott points out that the typical customer, for the most part, doesn’t require all that data. “For most aircraft, like those in the super-midsize category, air to ground is the best option.”

That explains why the partnership with flyExclusive also makes sense because, as Segrave points out, the Citation fleet is one of the most prolific. Earlier this year, in February, Textron Aviation said it delivered its 8,000th Citation.

• READ MORE: Textron Aviation Delivers 8000th Cessna Citation

Added to that, Helfgott explains that delivering reliable Wi-Fi to a fast-moving business jet is more complex than it seems. Using the Citation as an example, which Helfgott calls a “fast airplane,” the CEO explains just how difficult it is to do what his company does. 

“You can’t just take traditional 4G or 5G technologies, or even satellite technologies, and hope they’re just going to work on an airplane going that fast,” Helfgott said. “You need to adjust for the extended coverage. Handovers are happening nearly every 10 seconds because you’re going so fast. So, just thinking you can throw up a network and it’s going to work in aviation is a terrible idea.”  

Road to IPO

As for going public via a SPAC, Segrave says he’s not worried about the trend where SPAC companies have been struggling. Instead, he views it as a growth opportunity because, unlike others who’ve used that financing mechanism, flyExclusive’s operation isn’t “speculative.”

In other words, Segrave says he’s strived to build a responsible business since launching in North Carolina less than ten years ago in 2015. Aside from investing in customer experiences, he said the company has tried to become vertically integrated, for instance, by doing its required maintenance in-house. They’ve also done that with pilot training. 

• READ MORE: The Aviation Business Trend of 2021? SPAC Mania

It will be more challenging than it looks, though, because there is plenty of competition. The week before, Flexjet also announced its own SPAC-IPO, joining Wheels Up (NYSE: UP) already in that space. Then, there are the privately owned but well-funded Berkshire Hathaway’s NetJets, Inc. and Vista Global’s VistaJet and XO.

Even with his best efforts, Segrave admits, “there’s a lot of pressure.” He says that’s because FlyExclusive employs more than 800 workers, which the CEO says means the decisions the company makes have the potential to affect thousands of people—but he’s optimistic. 

“From our standpoint, the way we’ve grown this business is by investing in the customer experience. If we can pull it off in this market, it might put us in a really good place,” Segrave said.

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The published report follows collective efforts between the General Aviation Manufacturers Association (GAMA), the National Business Aviation Association (NBAA), and the FAA’s Flight Technologies and Procedures divisions. 

According to the FAA, the process now “streamlines the review of aircraft capabilities, training compliance and procedures compliance, and bundles a request for multiple common LOAs in a single application.”

“This should make what has been an extremely frustrating process for owners of new, technologically advanced aircraft significantly less burdensome, with much greater clarity on the requirements for aircraft, crews, and operational procedures,” said Brian Koester, NBAA’s director of flight operations and regulations. “We expect these standardized procedures to greatly enhance the efficiency of the LOA application process due to more consistent review and presentation of information.”

The guidance covers Part 91 operators who purchase new aircraft directly from OEMs, but Koester believes this is just the beginning. 

“Basically, we needed to start somewhere,” he said. “As both operators and the FAA gain experience with this new guidance, we should see similar procedures extended to other LOA application scenarios as well.”

Background

In 2009, a joint industry and government task force identified five “areas of concern” that they foresaw as NextGen technology began to enter the flight deck and require operators to gain approval for use of the new systems. In September 2018, the FAA established the LOA Process Improvement working group, which convened to focus specifically on NextGen technologies, including communications (data comm, ADS-C); navigation (performance-based navigation, or PBN); and surveillance (ADS-B Out utilization outside the U.S.) authorizations, as well as other aircraft capabilities such as enhanced flight vision systems (EFVS).

A report was released in January 2020 offering the working group’s recommendations for modernizing the policy mechanism and information that the FAA, aircraft OEMs, training providers, and operators use to allow Part 91 operators to conduct certain operations that require authorization for communications, navigation, and surveillance.

The most commonly requested LOAs include:

• enhanced vision systems
• equipment necessary to fly in North Atlantic High Level Airspace and certain other oceanic regions
• area navigation and required navigation performance terminal operations.

The post FAA Releases LOA Guidance for Part 91 Operators appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

“This progressive new debriefing capability will help promote a culture of continuous self-improvement and reinforce American’s safety-first mentality into every flight,” said Captain Neil Raaz, operations safety director at American Airlines, at the time in a statement.

It’s interesting that even at that advanced professional level, it’s imperative for pilots to engage in postflight debriefs outside of the training environment. It should underscore to students and flight instructors that post-activity debriefs are one of the essential tools of learning. 

It’s vital to master this skill because a flying career isn’t static. Pilots always have to be learning, which means accepting and integrating  feedback is paramount in getting to the next level. 

So, why do some people approach it so flippantly? 

Debrief Tools and Flight Instructing

As a quality assurance mentor in my last flight department, I helped implement a commercial debrief tool that offered a dynamic recreation of training flights using multiple aircraft systems sensor data. The system was data-driven and used artificial intelligence, advanced analysis, video integration, and a flight scoring tool. If you did a steep turn, it would automatically log the flight track and grade you based on the criteria you set. It also worked for instrument procedures, and the flight deck view was most helpful in replaying pitch and power settings. 

The goal wasn’t to supplant a flight instructor, but rather to augment their feedback.

What both American Airlines and my flight department did are results of the FAA’s Flight Operational Quality Assurance, or FOQA, program that encourages using data to enhance training.

Why Effective Feedback is Important 

But why do these programs matter? I think that they improve the feedback process overall. Indeed, beforehand—and widely still at some flight schools—the debrief process is arbitrary and rushed between instructors and their students. Students find themselves at the mercy of ill-equipped or unmotivated CFIs who can’t objectively explain how to perform better or even why they were able to perform a procedure correctly. Instead, when students struggle, instructors who don’t encourage a proper debrief process put their students in an expensive holding pattern, insisting on “just one more flight” to magically sort things out.

Considering that debriefs will be an essential tool for the rest of your career as a pilot, professionally or not, how then can you maximize your postflight process to be a better pilot? 

How Top Gun Pilots use Feedback

Prolific author and retired U.S. Air Force pilot James Albright recently explained how the U.S. Navy Strike Fighter Tactics Instructor Program used debrief tactics to rapidly improve Top Gun pilots’ skills during the Vietnam War. 

Albright explained that during the late 1960s, Navy pilots, as good as they were, found themselves no match for their Vietnamese opponents. Furthermore, they couldn’t pinpoint why they were successful in some aerial fights. Survival was a matter of good fortune. This led to a more empirical approach for the Top Gun flight school.

Albright writes that flight crews had to record every aspect of a flight—as much as practical—to be examined later. This postflight analysis became so important that, according to Albright, sometimes that discussion lasted longer than the flight itself. 

The debriefs covered a long list of things, from spatial and situational awareness flight discipline to energy management. Both instructors and students offered insights, but the goal eventually was to let the students lead and let them gain confidence in quizzing themselves and reviewing their performances.

“The ability to self-critique is key to continued improvement,” Albright says.

Some students today get antsy if a debrief begins to run long, perhaps to avoid an expensive bill, but not having that debrief will cost them in the long run.

In my experience, after a challenging flight, some students would blur their actual performance with personal and subjective self-critique. A helpful instructor won’t pile on but redirect them. Pilots who master self-critique early will hold themselves to high standards throughout their careers. 

Putting it Into Practice

So, what does an effective debrief process with helpful feedback look like?

I always think that instructors need to gain their students’ trust before saying anything. If your student doesn’t believe you intend to help them succeed, they won’t pay attention or participate. Even though flight activities can be stressful, lashing out will only erode any camaraderie when things go wrong. Instead, give feedback with positive intent. Once you establish that collaborative environment, the process will be more straightforward.

Tactically, the FAA recommends the 4-R process geared towards collaborative critique: replay, reconstruct, reflect, and redirect. In each step, the instructor and student go back and forth on the details of an entire flight, seeking to unpack as much as possible as the Top Gun pilots did.

With flight tracking technologies like I mentioned earlier, pilots today have more help than ever. If you can gain access to those technologies, they’ll improve your process. They’ll allow you to be exact about performances and specific about areas of improvement. A good instructor will embrace the challenge of creating performance notes and profiles to help their students improve. A good student will seek to do it, regardless.

• READ MORE: Previous editions of “What a CFI Wants You to Know”

Few people like being told how to do things better, myself included. It’s tough hearing about your shortcomings, especially if you think you tried your best. Unfortunately, that mindset will limit you from achieving your maximum capability. 

In a weird way, having room for improvement is a good thing. So, great pilots seek feedback from instructors and others. If the process is done right, both pilots should walk away with shared lessons, techniques, and a further appreciation for more.

The post To Become a Better Pilot, Master the Top Gun Debrief appeared first on FLYING Magazine.