On January 18, Atlas Air Flight 3885 was between Miami and San Juan, Puerto Rico, when the crew received a fire indication in the Boeing 747-8F’s No. 2 engine at approximately 3,000 feet. An emergency was declared and the aircraft returned to Miami with no injuries reported.

• READ MORE: NTSB Issues Urgent Safety Warning for Some Boeing 737s

No signs of an uncontained engine failure were found, the NTSB’s final report noted, though minor burn damage was reported on the GEnx engine’s thrust reverser fan duct. The aircraft returned to service nine days later on January 27.

According to the agency’s report, a third-party maintenance contractor was tasked with performing a borescope inspection on the No. 2 engine, requiring the removal of a plug. Both the mechanic and inspector certified that the inspection had been completed in line with maintenance manual standards.

The removed plug was found loose in the engine cowling, which resulted in the fire.

Editor’s Note: This article first appeared on AirlineGeeks.com.

The post NTSB Blames Boeing 747 Engine Fire on Shoddy Maintenance Work appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

The airplane, manufactured in 1960, had been updated with, among other things, a couple of flight data recorders. Their memory cards survived the crash and allowed National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigators to trace in minute detail the events that led to it.

The 1,765-hour, instrument-rated commercial pilot, 43, an insurance agent and entrepreneur, had earlier flown a longtime friend from Fayetteville to Stuttgart, Arkansas. The trip took an hour. The friend, who had previously co-owned a Cirrus with the accident pilot and knew him well, reported that the flight was uneventful and that the pilot took off to return to Drake Field in Fayetteville (KFYV) 15 minutes after landing. He said that the pilot had told him that the airplane was fully fueled before they left Fayetteville. 

It was late dusk and a full moon had just risen when the Bonanza, cruising at 4,500 feet, approached Drake Field. Eighteen miles out, it began a gradual descent at about 425 feet per minute. At 10 miles, the pilot called the tower and was cleared to land. 

• READ MORE: Nothing Short of a Fatal Mismatch

When the Bonanza was around 3 miles from Drake, its speed decreased and its rate of descent increased. Six hundred feet above the ground, it started a left turn toward an open field, but before it reached the field its left wing struck a tree and it fell, out of control, to the ground. The airplane came to rest upright but fragmented. There was no fire.

NTSB investigators found nothing wrong with the engine, and there was ample fuel in the main tanks. The auxiliary tanks were empty. The fuel selector was set to the left main.

A decade or two ago an accident like this would have fallen into the “for unknown reasons” category. The electronic data recording devices, however, led the NTSB straight to the probable cause—”the pilot’s mismanagement of the airplane’s fuel system.” 

In order to understand how a man described by his old friend as a “really good” pilot who was “knowledgeable” and “particular” about how he operated an airplane, one must first understand the fuel system of the M35.

The airplane had two main fuel tanks of 25 gallons each and two optional auxiliary tanks of 10 gallons each for a total capacity of 70 gallons. Its 260 hp engine burned around 14 gph in cruise. The fuel injection system of the IO-470, like all Continental fuel injection systems, pumped more fuel than the engine needed and sent the unused portion back to a tank. According to the airplane handbook, the vapor return amounted to 10 gph. If a main tank was selected, the vapor return went to it. If the aux tanks were selected, which fed simultaneously, the vapor fuel went to the left main. 

This arrangement had several implications. One was that even though the engine was burning only 13 or 14 gph, the 20 gallons of auxiliary fuel would be gone in less than 50 minutes. Another was that if the aux tanks were selected before there was space for the return fuel in the left main, the return fuel would be vented overboard. The POH discouraged switching to the auxiliary tanks before the left main was half empty.

• READ MORE: A Cautionary Tale About Pilot Freelancing

 The POH instructed the pilot to take off on the left main (and, without explanation, not to take off with less than 13 gallons in each main). On the trip to Stuttgart, the pilot actually appears to have taken off on the right main and switched to the left six minutes later. After 26 minutes, he selected the aux tanks and continued to feed from them for the remainder of the flight, presumably returning to a main tank shortly before landing. At Stuttgart he had about 54 or 55 gallons of fuel remaining, of which around 8 were in the aux tanks and 24 in the left main.

On the return flight, he burned fuel from the right tank for the first 49 minutes. He then made a fateful decision: He selected the aux tanks. 

Seven minutes later, return fuel from the aux tanks had filled the left main and presumably begun to run out the vent. After another six minutes the fuel pressure began to fluctuate, and then it disappeared entirely. The Bonanza was now 1,400 feet above the runway elevation and several miles out. The remaining 40 seconds of electronic data showed no restoration of fuel pressure.

Evidentally the pilot had selected the left main and was attempting a restart when time and altitude ran out. The NTSB did not speculate about why the engine failed to restart. Presumably there was quite a bit of air in the lines. The pilot did maintain control of the airplane, and although he slowed it to minimum speed before impact, he did not stall it.

The NTSB report credits the pilot with 377 hours in “this make and model,” but it is silent on an important question: Was the fuel system on his previous Bonanza differently configured from that on this one? In an online post, one of the pilot’s associates stated that the Bonanza he was flying “was a new one to him” and “an unfamiliar airplane” but does not say in what way it was unfamiliar.

If the Bonanza he had previously owned lacked the optional auxiliary tanks, it’s possible that the pilot had not yet developed a set of habitual operating procedures for them. If he had, he might not have made the mistake of switching to the aux tanks, which contained only a few gallons of fuel, with little time remaining in the flight and with almost no room for return fuel in the left main. Nor, perhaps—assuming that he had not forgotten how little fuel was left in the aux tanks—would he have placed reliance on the ancient float-type fuel quantity senders, which were prone to drop out entirely at the seldom-visited, near-empty ends of their potentiometers, to keep him from running a tank dry. 

• READ MORE: Two Fatal Cases of the Simply Inexperienced

Maybe, because switching to the fuller main is part of the airplane’s prelanding checklist, he performed a mental calculation—8 gallons in the aux tanks, 10 minutes to landing, reduced flow in the descent—and concluded that there would still be fuel in the aux tanks when he ran his prelanding checks. But in that case he may have forgotten that fuel was being drawn from the aux tanks at nearly double the rate that the engine was using it.

All airplanes have quirks. The Bonanza POH provided an accurate and concise description of the fuel system but did not trace every hypothetical path from a feature to a problem. It’s up to the pilot—especially one becoming acquainted with an unfamiliar airplane—to ensure that a quirk doesn’t turn into a pitfall.

Note: This article is based on the National Transportation Safety Board’s report of the accident and is intended to bring the issues raised to our readers’ attention. It is not intended to judge or reach any definitive conclusions about the ability or capacity of any person, living or dead, or any aircraft or accessory.

This column first appeared in the September Issue 950 of the FLYING print edition.

The post It’s Up to Pilot to Ensure Quirk Doesn’t Turn Into Pitfall appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

According to Reuters, the audit will evaluate each airport’s risks, identify potential issues with procedures and equipment, and make recommendations to improve safety. FAA’s Air Traffic Safety Oversight Service is conducting the review and expects to complete it by early 2025.

The agency’s study is partly in response to recommendations made in November 2023 by an independent aviation review team, which called for urgent actions to enhance safety after several close calls involving passenger jets.

As recently as September, a controller cleared a Southwest Airlines plane to cross a runway just seconds before another controller cleared an Alaska Airlines jet to take off. The Alaska aircraft was forced to abort its takeoff to prevent a collision from occurring, narrowly averting disaster.

These incidents have raised concerns among aviation stakeholders and agencies like the National Transportation Safety Board, which is currently investigating multiple close calls. Meanwhile, the FAA says it is in the process of implementing new surface-awareness technologies at airports around the country to further enhance safety and mitigate incursion incidents.

Editor’s Note: This article first appeared on AVweb.

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According to the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Office, the bodies of five adults were discovered at the crash site, located in steep, rugged terrain approximately a mile west of the airport. Emergency crews were dispatched following a 911 call from a cellphone that indicated involvement in a collision, providing GPS coordinates for the location.

KTLA reported that the aircraft belonged to Ali Safai, 73, a former flight instructor, who made the trip from Santa Monica Airport to Catalina Airport to help two pilots from Proteus Flight school who were stranded due to mechanical issues. FlightAware shows the aircraft departed Santa Monica Airport around 6 p.m. and arrived at Catalina Airport some 20 minutes later.  

Tuesday’s crash occurred around 8 p.m. though the airport officially closes at 5 p.m. It is unclear if the pilot had prior permission to operate after hours.

Catalina Airport, often referred to as the “Airport in the Sky,” is situated at an elevation of 1,602 feet on an island 25 miles off the coast of Los Angeles. Its single 3,000-foot runway can present challenges for pilots, particularly due to potential downdrafts caused by the surrounding terrain.

The NTSB and FAA said the crash occurred under “unknown circumstances” and the investigation is ongoing.

Editor’s Note: This article first appeared on AVweb.

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The SAFO is directed at aircraft equipped with optional Collins Aerospace SVO-730 Rudder Rollout Guidance Actuators (RRGA).

The SAFO, issued this week, identified the potential issue on Boeing 737, 737 -600/-700,-800,-900,- 900ER(737NG) and 737-8, -8200, and -9 (737 Max) series airplanes, noting that the Collins Aerospace SVO-730 RRGA is optional equipment, and not all aircraft have it.

The SAFO was issued after a flight crew of a United Airlines 737-8 reported the rudder pedals were stuck in the neutral position as the aircraft rolled out on landing at Newark Liberty International Airport (KEWR) in New Jersey in February. 

• READ MORE: NTSB Issues Urgent Safety Warning for Some Boeing 737s

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) preliminary report released in March indicated that the servo that activates the rudders may have been adversely impacted by the cold. That determination was made, according to the agency, after the incident actuator and an identical unit from another airplane were cold-soaked and tested in a cold environment, and the actuators’ function was found to be significantly compromised.

In September the agency made urgent safety recommendations to Boeing and notified the FAA about the potential issue involving the rudder of some 737 aircraft in the event the rollout guidance actuator becomes unresponsive.

The NTSB reported that investigators found evidence of moisture in the actuators that had failed, and Collins subsequently determined that a sealed bearing was incorrectly assembled during production of the actuators, leaving the unsealed side more susceptible to moisture that can freeze and limit rudder system movement.

The NTSB said that, “Collins notified Boeing that more than 353 actuators that Collins had delivered to Boeing since February 2017 were affected by this condition.”

According to the FAA, “if the rudder restriction condition is encountered in flight, Boeing recommends flight crews follow the jammed or restricted flight controls non-normal Checklist (NNC). If this rudder restriction is encountered on the ground, use differential braking to maintain runway centerline. Avoid using nose wheel steering above 100 knots indicated airspeed (kias) unless necessary for airplane control as a potential for over-control exists.”

Per the Boeing operations manual bulletin, “restricted rudder may also be identified during a dual autopilot approach on airplanes equipped with fail operational autoland systems with RRGA installed. The autoflight system conducts a test of the autopilot rudder servo after capturing the localizer or glideslope, when below 1,500 feet to verify servo functionality by initiating a small movement of the rudder.”

If there is an issue with the RRGA, a “NO LAND” message will alert the flight crew, which can then abort the landing and climb to a safe altitude to follow the company approved procedures for jammed or restricted flight controls.

The full FAA SAFO may be found here.

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According to an NTSB statement, the FAA has also been made aware of the potential for the rudder to jam or become unresponsive because of the failure of a rollout guidance actuator.

The NTSB investigation was spurred by a February 6 incident that occurred when the flight crew of a United Airlines 737-8 reported the rudder pedals were stuck in the neutral position as the aircraft rolled out on landing at Newark Liberty International Airport (KEWR) in New Jersey.

• READ MORE: NTSB Investigates Boeing Rudder Malfunction Incident in Newark

As the rudders are a flight control system, federal regulations required the NTSB to be notified of the malfunction. The actuator is made by Collins Aerospace and in the U.S. installed on 737s only operated by United Airlines. According to the FAA, these units are no longer in service.

The Investigation

The NTSB preliminary report released in March indicated that the servo that activates the rudders may have been adversely impacted by the cold. That determination was made, according to the agency, after the incident actuator and an identical unit from another airplane were cold-soaked and tested in a cold environment, and the actuators’ function was found to be significantly compromised.

“Investigators found evidence of moisture in both actuators, which failed testing,” NTSB said. “Collins Aerospace subsequently determined that a sealed bearing was incorrectly assembled during production of the actuators, leaving the unsealed side more susceptible to moisture that can freeze and limit rudder system movement.”

The NTSB said that “Collins notified Boeing that more than 353 actuators that Collins had delivered to Boeing since February 2017 were affected by this condition.”

According to information provided by the NTSB, “Boeing’s 737 flight manual instructs pilots confronted with a jammed or restricted rudder to ‘overpower the jammed or restricted system [using] maximum force, including a combined effort of both pilots.'”

In the recommendation, the NTSB expressed concern that the amount of force applied to the rudders during landing or rollout could result in a “ sudden, large, and undesired rudder deflection that could unintentionally cause loss of control or departure from a runway.” 

The safety agency recommended that Boeing determine appropriate flight crew responses besides applying maximum pedal force for such situations in flight or during landing. It also said that Boeing should notify flight crews operating 737s with affected actuators that the rudder control system could potentially jam if moisture accumulates inside the actuators and freezes.

In a statement to FLYING, Boeing said it was reviewing the NTSB recommendations.

“In August, we informed affected 737 operators of a potential condition with the rudder rollout guidance actuator, which is part of an optional autoland system,” Boeing said. “The autoland system includes layers of redundancy and we are working with our supplier to develop additional guidance to address the potential condition. We will keep our regulator informed of our progress. We will also ensure flight crews have the appropriate operating procedures.”

FAA Recommendations

The NTSB  recommended that the FAA determine if actuators with incorrectly assembled bearings should be removed from the aircraft, “and if so, to direct U.S. operators to do so until replacements are available.” It also recommended the agency notify aviation regulators in other countries operating B-737s, and encourage them to require removal of the affected actuators until replacements are available. 

The FAA told FLYING that the agency “appreciates and accepts this recommendation from the NTSB. As a party to the investigation, the agency has been monitoring this situation closely.”

The agency is expected to convene a corrective action review board based upon the NTSB’s interim recommendations to determine the next steps.

The post NTSB Issues Urgent Safety Warning for Some Boeing 737s appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

Both Quisenberry and flight instructor Timothy McKellar Jr., 22, were killed when their Piper PA-28-161 was ripped apart in a thunderstorm during a night flight.

The suit names Eagle Flight Academy, where both Quisenberry and McKellar had done their primary flight training, along with ATP Flight Center, where McKellar earned his instructor certificate. 

The 28-page complaint filed this week by Ransdell Roach & Royse PLLC of Lexington, Kentucky, documented the events that led up to the ill-fated flight on September 27, 2023.

Quisenberry, 18, had been flying with Eagle Flight Academy since April 2022. According to the lawsuit, the majority of Quisenberry’s training was done with CFI Ronnie Bunn.

According to McKellar’s social media posts in 2020, he also trained at Eagle Flight Academy, and Bunn was also his instructor in October of that year when he did his first solo. 

McKellar completed his training at ATP in Indiana, earning his instructor certificate in May 2023. On his social media pages, McKellar listed himself as an instructor pilot for ATP.

According to the lawsuit, however, “McKellar was employed by ATP for a brief period as a CFI but despite having been trained and certified at ATP Louisville Flight School, he was discharged from employment by ATP due to unsatisfactory performance as a CFI.”

The night cross-country flight was the first time Quisenberry flew with McKellar. According to the Quisenberry family, Bunn is colorblind, therefore he could not act as pilot in command (PIC) on a night flight.

The plan was to fly from Owensboro-Daviess County Regional Airport (KOWB) to Bowling Green-Woodhurst Airport (KBWG) in Kentucky.

McKellar documented the night flight through a series of photos and videos, posting to his Snapchat account. The posts began with McKellar on camera, shaking his head with the caption, “me and this student should not get along if he was my full-time student. I’ve seen faster at the Special Olympics.”

The video then flipped around to show Quisenberry, checklist in hand as he performed the preflight inspection of the aircraft in the dark, while McKellar drummed his fingers on the fuselage of the plane.

There were more posts during the flight with McKellar referring to Quisenberry as “Forrest Gump Jr.” and “not being the sharpest tool in the shed.” These posts went viral and are included in the complaint.

The forecast for the area that night indicated the probability of thunderstorms. According to FlightAware, the aircraft reached Bowling Green and made multiple circuits in the pattern then headed back toward Owensboro.

McKellar posted a Snapchat of the aircraft’s flight path and the approaching weather, commenting that thunderstorms were heading toward them “like pissed-off hornets.”

NTSB Investigation

According to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) preliminary accident report, the aircraft flew through “heavy to extreme precipitation” shortly after the final Snapchat entry was posted.

McKellar requested an IFR clearance and control gave them a heading to fly. McKellar responded that they were getting “blown around like crazy,” and the aircraft was in “extreme turbulence.”

The complaint noted that the aircraft appeared to be flying in circles before radio contact was lost.

The next morning the wreckage was found spread out over 25 acres of hilly terrain. The aircraft, per the NTSB, was missing its left wing. The bodies of both men were recovered.

The NTSB investigation is still underway and the agency has not released a final report on the cause of the accident.

Prior Knowledge?

The lawsuit alleges that Eagle Flight Academy and ATP knew about McKellar’s deficiencies as an instructor but “did not take adequate remedial actions” to address them.

Following the 2023 crash, FLYING made multiple attempts to reach Eagle Flight Academy and its owner, Wilford Voyles Jr., but calls and emails were not returned. The flight school closed in December 2023. ATP did not respond to FLYING’s request for comment.

The lawsuit asks for a jury trial as the family of Quisenberry are seeking to recover the cost of funeral expenses and other unspecified damages.

In interviews with Spectrum News 1 Kentucky, the Quisensberrys noted that the derogatory social media posts made by McKellar were very much a catalyst in their decision to file the lawsuit.

The post Family Sues After Student Pilot Killed in Kentucky Crash appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

The agency intends to use this software to more effectively track its increasing number of uncrewed aerial systems (UAS), which are vital for investigating accidents. The NTSB does not have a centralized system for tracking its drones, which are used to capture video and photos of incidents and perform mapping and photogrammetry.

In its posting, the NTSB notes that, until recently, its UAS program has been operated on a small scale, with just five drones, four active crewmembers, and one program lead. Documentation of fleet assets and personnel was managed manually through basic spreadsheets and databases, a process the agency described as “archaic” and “inefficient,” making it difficult to maintain a robust safety management system.

The NTSB said it has recently launched its UAS Flight Operations program—expanding its aircraft fleet from five to 12 drones—and has increased personnel to a team of 15.

“Implementation of a solution for both aircraft and program management will serve to improve the effectiveness and integrity of NTSB investigations,” the agency said.

Editor’s Note: This article first appeared on AVweb.

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Three miles out from the airport, the pilot of the C-340A announced he was doing a straight-in. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determined the larger, faster airplane was not configured for landing as its approach speed was 180 knots. The published flap extension speed for the C-340A is 160 knots, and the landing gear extension speed is 140 knots.

Muscle memory, checklist use, and procedures often go hand in hand. Had the pilot of the C-340A flown the traffic pattern for the airport beginning with maneuvering for 45-degree angle entry on to the downwind at midfield, he might have remembered to slow down the airplane and configure it for landing.

NTSB reports are full of similar but thankfully mostly non-fatal events that can occur when the pilot on a straight-in forgets the landing gear—often at a non-towered airport. 

At a towered airport, the controllers often contact the pilot and advise them that their gear is not down with a simple “check gear” query. NTSB investigations into gear-up landings often include a statement from the pilot, who note that the straight-in, devoid of the usual cues such as turning on to the 45 or downwind, resulted in forgetting to run the checklist, which included the action of lowering the landing gear with the phrase “gear down and locked.”

Many instructors, myself included, advocate for at least three gear checks: downwind, base, and final. In the faster aircraft such as a twin, the landing gear is often deployed on the 45 as a means to help slow down the aircraft.

In a fixed-gear airplane you don’t have to worry about the landing gear position, but checking the position of the gear if possible (like looking out the window in the high wing aircraft) is a good habit.

Verbalizing the checklist on each leg of the pattern is also a good habit. There may be things that are “deferred,” such as putting the propeller to full as one does on final in a complex airplane to facilitate a go-around if needed.

My U.S. Air Force Academy-trained instructor beat this into me—and recitation had to end with “check list complete” in my authoritative pilot voice.

On a straight-in approach, you miss the cues for aircraft configuration changes, such as power reduction and addition of flaps.

Here’s a teachable moment: dropping all the flaps at once can potentially bend metal if the aircraft is outside of V_FE, and will trigger a pitch change that catches many novice pilots by surprise. The natural reaction is to take all the flaps out in one movement, which makes the bad situation worse.

I demonstrate this to the learner at an appropriate altitude and at a flap-friendly speed in the practice area just so they know what it feels like and what it does to the airplane and why it is not something you want to mess with when you are close to the ground.

We then discuss how the incremental deployment of flaps prevents the pitch surprise, as does following the prelanding checklist on each leg of the pattern to achieve the published speeds for each leg as recommended by the manufacturer.

Poor Approach, Poor Landing

One of the first lessons to be taught to the novice pilot is that a poor approach results in a poor landing. If you are behind the airplane, as in slow to reduce throttle, start the descent, deploy flaps, that landing will be ugly. This can happen during straight in approaches as the legs of the pattern are a reminder to the pilot to run the checklist and reconfigure the aircraft.  Instead, the pilot relies on experience and knowledge of the aircraft performance to determine when to do configuration changes. This experience is best gained with a seasoned CFI next to you and flown in an appropriate environment, like at a towered airport when the pilot requests and ATC grants a straight-in approach.

Straight-ins at non-towered airports are especially dangerous as we learned by the Watsonville collision. When an aircraft comes bombing into a pattern already occupied by other aircraft, it is very much like running a red light. There may be someone closer than you think on a collision course. You can’t slam the brakes on an airplane in the air. Entering the pattern on the 45 at pattern altitude provides better situational awareness as it gives the pilot more of an opportunity to scan for traffic, see and avoid it.

It is for this reason many instructors discourage their learners from doing straight-in approaches. While I agree they are not a good idea at a non-controlled airport, they should be, at the very least, briefed and the scenario flown in the practice area so the learner knows when to refer to the checklist, when to reduce power, when to lower the flaps, etc.

Outside a request from a tower, there are times when a straight-in is called for, such as when a magneto fails a few miles outside the traffic pattern and the airport is the closest suitable runway.

This is the scenario I use with my learners, as I experienced it in the real world as a learner. My CFI demonstrated the proper technique, troubleshooting the issue to no avail, calling my attention to the diminished engine power available and sight picture, and ensuring that we had the runway made before applying flaps and reducing the power to idle.

Many years later, I was the CFI and had this happen. The straight-in and landing was a nonevent. The chief mechanic brought me fragments of metal that had been the left magneto to show my ground school class.

Another scenario where a straight-in is appropriate is when the weather that was VFR or MVFR drops to IFR and you, the noninstrument-rated pilot in the non-IFR-equipped aircraft need to get down quickly.

Don’t Be That Pilot

There are pilots who, when they hear another pilot on the radio state they are planning to do a straight-in approach, will scold the pilot or even threaten to call the FAA on them. This is not a discussion to have on the radio.

I have witnessed this at nontowered airports. I tell my learners not to engage that person. Focus on flying the airplane. If you are the pilot doing the straight-in for any of the above mentioned reasons—weather, a mechanical issue, or perhaps even an airsick passenger that necessitates getting on the ground quickly but not declaring an emergency—wait until you get on the ground before you get into a “discussion” with the other pilot. 

The post Why Straight-In Approaches Aren’t So Straightforward appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

SA-097 emphasized that “as little as 1/4-inch of wing-leading edge ice accumulation can increase the stall speed by 25 to 40 knots and cause sudden departure from controlled flight.”

The alert also warned that ice buildup on pitot tubes can lead to instrument failure, impacting readings for airspeed, altitude, and vertical speed.

The NTSB acknowledged that some pilots have been taught to wait for a certain amount of ice to accumulate on the leading edges before using deice boots due to concerns about ice bridging. However, the FAA’s recent tests show that modern deicing boots, from aircraft manufactured after 1960, are not prone to ice bridging.

The agency warned that performance issues may arise if deice boots are not engaged promptly when icing begins and advises pilots to refer to their operating handbooks for specific procedures on boot activation and use.

The alert also cited several accidents where failure to follow operating handbook instructions led to in-flight loss of control, underscoring the critical importance of adhering to recommended deicing practices.

Editor’s Note: This article first appeared on AVweb.

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