The catastrophe was recorded by a number of surveillance cameras, some located not far from the point of impact. Video showed the airplane airborne, initially drifting left, then yawing left to an extreme sideslip angle before rapidly rolling into an inverted dive. The sequence took just a few seconds. Once the left wing had dropped, the low altitude made recovery impossible.

The crew had not reported any trouble to the tower. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigators reconstructed the event by analyzing surveillance videos and the sound spectrum of the engines captured as background noise by the cockpit voice recorder, as well as extracting data from the airplane’s ADS-B and terrain awareness warning systems. They concluded the critical left engine had spooled down for some reason, and the pilot had reacted by pressing on the left rudder pedal rather than the right. Only the combination of asymmetric thrust with added rudder, the NTSB found, could bring the airplane to the extreme yaw angle observed in the videos, as asymmetric thrust alone would not have been sufficient.

The only communications between the two pilots recorded during the accident sequence were an exclamation of “What in the world?” by the pilot flying and the copilot’s statement, three and a half seconds later, that “You just lost your left engine.” (The King Air is a single-pilot airplane. The copilot frequently flew with the pilot to gain experience, but was not permitted to touch the controls when passengers were aboard.)

The NTSB suspected the spooldown of the left engine might have been caused by a faulty friction setting on the left power lever, which could have allowed it to creep backward during the takeoff roll. This is a known susceptibility of King Airs; the power levers are spring-loaded toward idle, each has its own friction knob, and they rely on positive friction to keep them from drifting. The power quadrant was too badly damaged in the post-crash fire to allow investigators to tell anything about the position of the left power lever or the friction settings. Uncommanded power rollbacks on the PT6-series engines can have other causes, however, which would not necessarily be detectable in a severely burned wreckage, and so the attribution to the friction setting remained speculative.

The quadrant frictions are a checklist item, but the CVR recording disclosed no pre-takeoff briefing and none of the expected checklist or V-speed callouts. According to other pilots who had flown with him, the pilot, 71, a 16,450-hour ATP, was “not strong on using checklists” and “just jumped in the airplane and went.” He was, on the other hand, “super strong” on knowledge of the airplane, in which he had logged 1,100 hours. According to the pilot who administered his most recent proficiency check, he had performed well on the simulated engine failure on takeoff. The check ride took place in the airplane, however, not in a simulator, and so as a safety precaution the engine cut, which had been briefed in advance, did not occur until the airplane was safely airborne and climbing. A successful performance under such controlled circumstances did not guarantee success in exigent ones.

The NTSB’s reconstruction of the takeoff showed the pilot had rotated at 102 kias, slightly below the V1 (go/abort) speed of 106 kias and 8 knots below the calculated rotation speed of 110 knots. The airplane was fully airborne at 106 kias and was at around 110 kias when the power began to roll back. The airplane drifted left, reaching a maximum altitude of 100 feet. Three seconds later, it was at 70 feet and the airspeed was 85 knots. One second later, it plunged through the hangar roof.

The standard procedure for loss of an engine in the King Air 350 is to establish a positive rate of climb with a pitch angle of 10 degrees, retract the landing gear, and feather the propeller on the inoperative engine while maintaining V2 (minimum safe climb speed with an engine out) to 400 feet agl. Above 400 feet, the airplane is allowed to accelerate, the flaps are retracted, and the climb continues at 125 kias.

None of this happened, however, because the pilot, in spite of his lifetime of flying experience and countless successful proficiency checks, stepped on the wrong rudder pedal.

• READ MORE: Objection Overruled

There was a time when the NTSB often cited fatigue as a contributing factor in accidents, but at some point it must have become obvious that plenty of well-rested pilots crashed too, so unless a pilot literally fell asleep at the wheel, fatigue could never be proved to have been a link in a causal chain. In this case, the pilot had a history of severe sleep apnea. To the extent that the FAA was aware of it, the agency had taken no action, although in principle the condition could have been disqualifying. The NTSB turned its back on this opportunity to invoke fatigue. “No evidence,” the agency wrote, “indicates that the pilot’s medical conditions or their treatment were factors in the accident.”

I would have expected the NTSB’s finding of “probable cause” to be something like “…the pilot’s inappropriate reaction to a loss of power in the left engine, which resulted in loss of control.” Instead, it blamed “the pilot’s failure to maintain airplane control,” which seems rather vague and generic. Among the contributing factors, “failure to conduct the airplane manufacturer’s emergency procedure” is a little misleading, since he did begin to execute the procedure but bungled it. The agency added his “failure…to follow the manufacturer’s checklists during all phases of operation,” even though the only link between checklists and the crash was the hypothetical faulty friction setting for which there was no material evidence. Two King Air pilots with whom I discussed the accident were skeptical of the friction theory because they said matching torques on two PT6s during takeoff involves enough fiddling with the power levers that it would be impossible for the pilot to be unaware of a sloppy-feeling lever.

I suspect the NTSB wanted to blame the accident on the pilot not being a by-the-book kind of person. None of his associates the NTSB interviewed suggested he was reckless or incompetent—quite the opposite. The problem with pinning the accident on a personality trait of the pilot is that the mistake of stepping on the wrong rudder pedal is not connected in any obvious way to that. It seems more like one of those random human mistakes we all sometimes make—but hope we will never make at a critical moment.

Note: This article is based on the National Transportation Safety Board’s report of the accident and is intended to bring the issues raised to our readers’ attention. It is not intended to judge or reach any definitive conclusions about the ability or capacity of any person, living or dead, or any aircraft or accessory.

This column first appeared in the August 2023/Issue 940 print edition of FLYING.

The post King Air 350 Accident Proved to Be Fatal Misstep appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

“The B-1B crashed while attempting to land,” the statement read. “All four members of the crew were able to eject safely. Three of the aircrew were treated on base for minor injuries and released, and one airman [is] currently being treated at a local hospital for non-life-threatening injuries.”

At the time of the accident, the automated weather reporting equipment at the airfield indicated poor visibility with low clouds and freezing temperatures.

The Air Force is in charge of the investigation.

“Our thoughts and prayers are with the aircrew and their families as they recover from this event,” said Colonel Derek Oakley, 28th Bomb Wing commander. “It is important that we support each other as we work to learn more about what occurred.”

About the B-1B

According to the Air Force, the B-1A was developed in the 1970s as a replacement for the B-52. Designed as a multimission platform, the B-1B entered use in the 1980s. Though it was first designed to carry nuclear as well as conventional weapons, in 1994 the military removed the B-1B—dubbed the Lancer—from nuclear operations, although it was still considered a heavy bomber suitable for nuclear armament until 2007.

The B-1B was built by Rockwell International/North American Aircraft, now Boeing.

Though 100 of the aircraft were originally built, only about 60 remain. In addition to Ellsworth, there are B-1 bombers in service at Dyess Air Force Base in Abilene, Texas.

The aircraft was first used in combat in 1998 in support of Operation Desert Fox in Iraq.

The post B-1B Suffers Landing Accident in South Dakota appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

According to CNN, the jet and the de Havilland DHC-8 collided shortly after the jet landed around 5 p.m. local time, after dark. Video captured from the terminal shows the jet skidding down the runway on a bed of flames. According to Japan Airlines, all 367 passengers and 12 crewmembers aboard were able to escape.

Japan aviation officials stated there were six people on board the Coast Guard Dash 8, but only one, identified by Japanese media as the commander, survived the initial impact. His condition is not known as this story went to press. The Coast Guard crew was en route to western Japan to deliver earthquake relief supplies in the wake of the 7.6 temblor that killed at least 48 and destroyed communities on New Year’s Day.

The JAL A350, identified as Flight 516, had departed New Chitose Airport (RJCC) in the northern prefecture of Hokkaido and was scheduled to land at Haneda. Passengers on board the jet reported hearing and feeling it hit something on the runway and then the cabin filled with smoke.

The runway was swarmed with fire trucks as the passengers and crew were evacuated from the stricken jet.

As this story was going to press, Shigenori Hiraoka, the director general of the civil aviation bureau at the transport ministry of Japan, could not provide details about the collision or if there had been communication between the aircraft or the aircraft and the control tower prior to impact.

This is a developing story, and FLYING will continue to provide updates.

The post Japan Airlines A350 and Earthquake Relief Dash 8 Collide on Runway appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

The report refers to the aircraft involved by their race numbers. Race 6, which is the North American T-6G, N2897G (Six Cat), and Race 14, North American AT-6B, N57418 (Baron’s Revenge).

Most of the information comes from the pilot flying Race 66, who was third for landing.

Per the NTSB report, the pilot of Race 66 stated he was turning to enter the downwind when he heard the pilots of Baron’s Revenge and Six Cat both transmit “Downwind, abeam.”

• READ MORE: Reno Air Races Canceled Following Fatal Collision

As the pilot of Race 66 did not see the two other aircraft, he slowed down to “create some space and time to see them.” He heard the pilot of Baron’s Revenge transmit that he was on the base leg with his gear down. As the pilot of Race 66 approached the base leg, he saw Six Cat, and transmitted that Race 66 was downwind abeam his intended point of touchdown. He did not see Baron’s Revenge at first. 

He told investigators that when he “finally spotted” Baron’s Revenge, it was below him on his right on base leg, and Six Cat was in level flight to his left. He added this was not where he expected the aircraft to be. He described the base leg flown by the pilot of Baron’s Revenge as wider than it had been on two previous flights, while that flown by Six Cat was “tighter” than his position.

Baron’s Revenge crossed in front of Race 66 from right to left, disappearing under his engine cowling, while Six Cat disappeared under his left wing.

The pilot of Race 66 transmitted that he had his gear down and started a left turn for the base leg of Runway 8.

He then saw Baron’s Revenge in level flight with “nothing behind the passenger seat” and watched as the aircraft rolled to the right and plunged down.

According to another witness, Baron’s Revenge was on a southerly heading on the base leg for Runway 8, approximately 300 feet agl, while Six Cat was on the downwind on a west-southwest heading at the same altitude.

The witness told investigators, “At the time of the collision, Six Cat Race 6 was at about a 75-degree angle in relation to the flight path of [Baron’s Revenge] Race 14.”

• READ MORE: Early Analysis of Fatal Reno Accident Offers Lessons

According to witnesses in the grandstands at the time of the accident, many people did not realize what had happened at first, as their attention was diverted because the race was over. Several people told FLYING they heard a gasp from the crowd, then turned around to see the aircraft appearing to disintegrate in mid air and dust rising from the desert floor as the wreckage tumbled to the ground. This was followed by a stunned silence falling over the crowd.

The Wreckage

The debris path began approximately 7,881 feet northwest of the approach end of Runway 8 and extended south to the main wreckage of Baron’s Revenge for a distance of 1,366 feet in length.

The debris field included “segments of the left aileron, segments of the left flap, right horizontal stabilizer, right elevator, sections of aft fuselage skin, and a plastic pouch with the airplane documents.”

Small pieces of black painted skin and plexiglass from Six Cat were found in the debris field. The wreckage of Six Cat came to rest in an open field. It was noted, “The wing structure was separated from the fuselage and the outboard left wing was separated at the attach joint. The wing sections were located about 30 ft south of the main wreckage.”

There was significant aftward compression of the fuselage, and the vertical stabilizer, rudder, tailwheel, left horizontal stabilizer, left elevator, and portions of fuselage skin from Baron’s Revenge were found commingled with the wreckage of Six Cat.

The wreckage of Baron’s Revenge came to rest in an open field. The entire wing section was compressed aft, separated from the fuselage, and located about 10 feet from the main fuselage wreckage.

The NTSB stresses that this report is preliminary and subject to change as more information is uncovered. The final report is still likely several months away.

The post NTSB Releases Preliminary Report on Reno Midair appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

Time builders are the flight instructors who, although they hold an instructor certificate, are focused on building their hours, not teaching. They may not know how to teach beyond the test because that’s how they were trained. This is particularly common if they went through an accelerated program where the focus is get ’em, get ’em out.

Rote learning, as opposed to understanding, application, and the level where we seek correlation often doesn’t happen. Correlation requires the learner to perform real-world tasks and exhibit in-depth knowledge by problem-solving rather than responding by rote.

It is coming back to bite us. The number of time builders teaching to the rote level is manifesting at the private pilot level as the failure rate for private pilot applicants on the check ride, which is higher than 50 percent in some places. They are being pushed through the pipeline just as many of their instructors were. The experience boxes have been checked and endorsements given, but even if the applicant passes the check ride, that doesn’t mean they are ready for the real world. This is particularly true of instructor applicants.

Currently, the instructor community at large is talking about a particular crash—I cannot in good conscience call this one an accident—that happened in Kentucky last week involving a time builder instructor with an affinity for social media and an 18-year-old private pilot candidate. I can’t call it an accident because there were so many blatant mistakes and failures to identify and address. I have been a CFI for 20 years, and I have never seen one like this before.

Details

On September 27, the Piper Warrior belonging to Eagle Flight Academy in Owensboro, Kentucky, was supposed to make a night flight from Owensboro/Daviess County Regional Airport (KOWB) to Bowling Green-Warren County Regional Airport (KBWG) in Kentucky.

Aboard were Connor Quisenberry, a private pilot candidate, and flight instructor Timothy McKellar Jr., 22.

The events of the evening were documented by McKellar on Snapchat. That’s right. The flight instructor decided to document the flight. It is clear that Quisenberry is not a regular student of McKellar’s, because McKellar’s Snapchat story begins with him talking to the camera and shaking his head along with the caption, “me and this student should not get along if he was my full-time student. I’ve seen faster at the Special Olympics.”

If that blatant smear isn’t enough to turn the viewer away, it gets worse. The camera angle is then reversed to show Quisenberry, flashlight in hand, performing what appears to be the preflight inspection of the Warrior. McKellar impatiently taps his fingers on the outside of the aircraft.

McKellar expresses impatience with Quisenberry who “wanted to have a conversation” when the instructor wants to get the flight over with because he has to be up at 4:30 a.m. McKellar refers to Quisenberry as “Forrest Gump.” The time stamp of the Snapchat shows 8:39 p.m. as McKellar is heard saying, “C’mon.” He posts that the pair have a three-hour flight ahead. The video continues showing the night takeoff and in-flight cruise.

McKellar makes a second reference to Quisenberry as Forrest Gump, stating that he is “just giving it to him straight up,” to which Quisenberry allegedly replies to the criticism by saying, “I don’t mind you being hard on me. I know I need it.”

The final Snapchat posted by McKellar shows a preview of the flight path from Bowling Green to Owensboro over top radar showing severe storms heading toward them.

McKellar circles the storms and writes, “headed are [sic] way like a group of pissed off hornets.”

It has not escaped the instructor community that McKellar, who was critical of the intellectual capacity of Quisenberry, uses “are” instead of “our” in his post. And continued the flight into a thunderstorm.

The TAFs and METARs from the area at the time of the flight showed severe weather in all quadrants. The question is asked:  Given this information as noted by Snapchat, why did the flight continue?

The Last Moments

You cannot visually see thunderclouds at night, but apparently the flight continued into them as FlightAware shows the aircraft made some extreme altitude fluctuations, and McKellar asked for an IFR clearance and was told to head east before contact was lost.

According to local law enforcement, the wreckage was found spread out over three-quarters of a mile in mountainous terrain. The National Transportation Safety Board is expected to release a preliminary report on the accident in a few weeks.

Aftermath

McKellar’s behavior will likely be used as a case study for future flight instructor candidates. Frustration on the part of both the instructor and learner is a normal part of the flight training process, and both must learn to deal with it.

The flight instructor is supposed to be able to compartmentalize it, or at the very least restrain themself from publicly shaming their learner on social media. It goes the other way too. Learners who do this to their instructors will likely find themselves ostracized from the flight school. Remember the phrase “praise in public, criticize in private”—and make that criticism constructive.

McKellar’s friends and family have defended him on social media, insisting “Junior was a jokester and just messing with his student” and suggesting people view McKellar’s YouTube channel.

There is a lot of aviation there, including a video where McKellar appears to sip 100LL from a sump cup then jokes how he will smell like fuel for the rest of the day.

McKellar was a relatively inexperienced instructor. His social media shows he soloed in October 2020 at a small flight school then did the bulk of his training at ATP Flight School, the largest accelerated training program in the U.S. He earned his commercial and flight instructor certificates in May 2023. It is not clear how many hours of dual instruction he had accrued before the last flight.

Had McKellar not chosen to Snapchat the ill-fated flight, this might have been viewed as just a bad accident. Rule No. 1 is keep the learner safe, noting the pilot in command (PIC)—in this case, the CFI—is responsible for the safety of the flight. McKellar was PIC, and he failed miserably at this task.

Is This One Age Related?

It has been suggested that age is a factor in this event. How mature were you at 22? Were you starting a business? Going to school? Still living off Mom and Dad? Starting a career? Trying to find a career? Maturity at any age runs the gamut. 

While there is a numeric quality to maturity, it very much depends on the person. There is no maturity test for flight instructors, which is unfortunate since, although it is an entry level position to a flying career, the stakes are quite high.

There are 18- to 20-somethings who work as CFIs as a means of building their hours and are good teachers. They listen to their learners and seek the counsel of more experienced instructors when they run into a challenge. They may even sit in on the ground schools taught by more experienced instructors because they want to improve their skills. They understand that telling a learner about something or demonstrating it in the aircraft doesn’t necessarily mean learning has taken place.

Much of this comes down to communication skills. As far as McKellar’s “giving it to [sic] the learner straight up,” direct communication can be accomplished without being insulting. When providing guidance to the learner, refer to the airman certification standards for the metrics they are measured to. “Your altitude sucks” or “you’re so rusty, we need a jack hammer” are neither professional nor helpful communication. All the learner may take from this is that they don’t want to fly with you again.

It is heartbreaking that Quisenberry allegedly accepted McKellar’s behavior as the norm. Connor, I know you can’t hear me when I say this, but I speak to all the other Connors out there: I am sorry this happened to you. Albeit, the concept of an instructor being hard on a learner can be a matter of perspective. If an instructor says your skills need some work, they don’t say it to be mean. The professional CFIs will pull out the ACS to show you where the soft spots in your skills are. Then they will help you shore them up. No CFI wants you to bend metal, get hurt or fail a check ride.

There is a big difference between “being hard” on a learner by holding you to the standards set forth in the ACS and being insulting or verbally abusive. If you had a little more life experience under your belt, you might have walked away from this CFI. And no one would have blamed you.

The post Death by Time Builder appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

McSpadden was in the right seat. Russ Francis, a former NFL tight end and the new owner of Lake Placid Airways, was in the left seat according to the Lake Placid News. AOPA spokesman Eric Blinderman stated that early reports indicate the Cardinal had “an emergency on takeoff” from Lake Placid shortly before 5 p.m. EDT.

“They tried to get back but didn’t make the runway,” said Blinderman.

The nature of the emergency wasn’t immediately known. Blinderman said more information will be available on Monday.

McSpadden was a former commander of the USAF Thunderbirds air demonstration team and joined the Air Safety Institute in 2017. He was well known in the GA community for his analyses of accidents and the safety-related content he and his staff created for free distribution. He was also highly regarded by his many friends and colleagues.

“We are beyond heartbroken,” said Blinderman. “This is the worst kind of news to process as a friend, colleague and fellow aviator.” He is survived by his wife, Judy, son Grant and daughter Annabel.

Editor’s Note: This article first appeared on AVweb.com.

The post Air Safety Institute’s Richard McSpadden Dies In Crash appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

During the 90-minute flight from Kunming to Guangzhou, China, the airliner went into a near vertical dive over a rural area, impacting a mountain so hard that it fragmented, leaving a crater 60 feet deep.

The jet plunged from 29,000 feet. The last recorded airspeed was 628 mph (545 knots). 

Information from the airplane’s flight data recorder and cockpit voice recorder recovered in the crash, the journal reported, suggests inputs to the controls pushed the airplane into the dive, according to the paper’s sources. 

So little is known about the circumstances surrounding the tragedy that there have been numerous unanswered questions about its cause. 

A statement released last April by the Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC) noted that there were no issues uncovered in a review of the aircraft’s maintenance records, and the weather at the time of the accident did not appear to be a factor. In previous reports, the CAAC noted the flight crew appeared to be well trained, and there were no issues there either.

In fact, immediately following the crash, concerns about the aircraft type prompted the airline to ground all 223 of its 737-800s as a precaution. The airliners were inspected and airworthiness for each aircraft verified. Those aircraft returned to flight in April.

The CAAC is leading the investigation, but because the accident involves an aircraft designed and built in the U.S., Boeing, CFM—the manufacturers of the engine—and the National Transportation and Safety Board (NTSB) are assisting in the investigation.

Both so-called “black boxes”—the flight data recorder and the cockpit voice recorder—are in Washington, D.C., being studied by the NTSB. 

The flight data recorder provides information about the aircraft speed, altitude, and engine operations. The cockpit voice recorder should have captured conversations on the flight deck, which could potentially reveal what caused the aircraft to enter the dive. 

Investigators have determined that the onset of the jet’s steep dive appears to have coincided with the time that they would normally begin a descent to the destination.

Editor’s note: FLYING’s Meg Godlewski contributed to this report. 

The post Report: Data Suggests Intentional Nosedive in China Eastern Plane Crash appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

“The U.S. Navy is making recovery operations arrangements for the F-35C aircraft involved in the mishap aboard USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) in the South China Sea, Jan. 24,” 7th Fleet spokesperson Lt. Nicholas Lingo said in a statement.

The Navy pilot ejected from the F-35C Lightning II during the incident and was recovered from the water by a U.S. military helicopter, Lingo said. The pilot was listed as in stable condition.

• READ MORE: U.S. Navy Pilot Ejects During F-35C ‘Landing Mishap’

The incident, which is now under investigation, occurred during routine flight operations involving a fighter jet assigned to the Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 2, according to the service.

Seven sailors on board the aircraft carrier were also injured in the incident, four who were treated onboard for their injuries and three who were listed as in stable condition after they were transported by a medevac flight to a medical facility in Manilla, Philippines.

The Navy did not provide information about the F-35C’s condition or status.

Recovering the remains of the advanced stealth fighter from international waters before other countries—namely China—potentially do so is a priority for the Navy, according to several observers.

The aircraft’s stealth technology make the wreckage and incident site a tempting target, retired Marine aviator Steve Ganyard told ABC News. “The race is on now to get the appropriate kind of recovery gear, the deep diving submersibles that actually pull the wreckage up off the bottom of the ocean,” he said.

China will likely try to find and survey the wreckage site through the use of submarines and deep diving submersibles, Carl Schuster, a former director of operations at the U.S. Pacific Command’s Joint Intelligence Center in Hawaii, told CNN. 

According to Schuster, China could potentially attempt to make a claim for the salvage rights based on its South China Sea territorial claims. “Salvaging the plane with commercial and coast guard assets will enable Beijing to claim it is recovering a potential environmental hazard or foreign military equipment from its territorial waters,” he told CNN.

• READ MORE: USS Abraham Lincoln Deploys With First Female Commander

Over the weekend, the Carl Vinson and USS Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Groups launched drills in the South China Sea, the U.S. 7th Fleet said Monday. During the exercise, ships and aircraft were to conduct coordinated surface and air operations.

Earlier this month, the USS Abraham Lincoln deployed with the Marine Corps’ first F-35C Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter squadron, and at the helm, the first female commander of a U.S. Navy nuclear-powered aircraft carrier.

The F-35 landing mishap is the second reported in less than a month. A South Korean F-35A was forced into an emergency belly landing January 4 when its landing gear malfunctioned.

• READ MORE: Bird Strike Blamed For F-35 Belly Landing In South Korea

The post Navy Launches F-35 Recovery Efforts Following ‘Landing Mishap’ appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

The January 24 incident, which is now under investigation, occurred during routine flight operations. It involved a fighter jet assigned to the Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 2, according to the service.

“The pilot safely ejected from the aircraft and was recovered via U.S. military helicopter,” the Navy said in a statement.

Seven sailors on board the aircraft carrier were also injured in the incident, four who were treated onboard for their injuries and three who were listed as in stable condition after they were transported by a medevac flight to a medical facility in Manilla, Philippines.

The Navy did not provide information about the F-35C’s condition or status.

• READ MORE: USS Abraham Lincoln Deploys With First Female Commander

Over the weekend, the Carl Vinson and USS Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Groups launched drills in the South China Sea, the U.S. 7th Fleet said Monday. During the exercise, ships and aircraft were to conduct coordinated surface and air operations.

According to the Navy, CVW-2 consists of the following units:

• “Argonauts” of Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 147 (F-35C squadron)
• “Bounty Hunters” of VFA-2 (F/A-18E/F Super Hornet squadrons)
• “Stingers” of VFA-113 (F/A-18E/F Super Hornet squadrons)
• “Golden Dragons” of VFA-192 (F/A-18E/F Super Hornet squadrons)
• “Gauntlets” of Electronic Attack Squadron (VAQ) 136, operating the EA-18G Growler; 
• “Black Eagles” of Airborne Command and Control Squadron (VAW) 113, operating the E-2D Advanced Hawkey
• “Titans” of Fleet Logistics Multi-Mission Squadron (VRM) 30, operating the CMV-22B Osprey
• “Black Knights” of Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron (HSC) 4, operating the MH-60S Sea Hawk
• “Blue Hawks” of Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron (HSM) 78, operating the MH-60R Sea Hawk

Earlier this month, the USS Abraham Lincoln deployed with the Marine Corps’ first F-35C Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter squadron, and at the helm, the first female commander of a U.S. Navy nuclear-powered aircraft carrier.

The F-35 landing mishap is the second reported in less than a month. A South Korean F-35A was forced into an emergency belly landing January 4 when its landing gear malfunctioned.

• READ MORE: Bird Strike Blamed For F-35 Belly Landing In South Korea

The post U.S. Navy Pilot Ejects During F-35C ‘Landing Mishap’ appeared first on FLYING Magazine.

The pilot, who had not visited the area before, flew up and down the river for some time looking for his friend. When he located him—just arriving—he landed northward on a straight segment of the 100-yard-wide river and tied up at a boat dock. Learning that his friend was about to go downstream on a paddleboard to hunt for a dog’s life jacket that had fallen into the water earlier in the day, the pilot said that he would help in the search after he had unloaded his gear from the airplane.

What Happened

A short time later, the Buccaneer took off northward, made a 180-degree left turn, and dropped down to treetop level to follow the river downstream. In the meantime, the paddler had retrieved the life jacket and was making his way back toward the campsite. His view was obscured by trees at a bend in the river, but he heard the airplane’s engine stop suddenly.

An 8-year-old boy saw the accident from upriver, nearly a mile away. He said that the airplane was flying below the tops of the trees lining the riverbanks when suddenly it flipped over backward and fell into the water.

It took the paddler and another would-be rescuer three or four minutes to reach the airplane. It lay inverted in shallow water. They tried to extricate the pilot, but he was already dead from impact injuries.

Directly above the wreckage, several power lines crossed the river. Their presence is indicated on the Jacksonville sectional chart by a tiny tower icon. There was nothing—no pennants, no red-and-white balls—to enhance the visibility of the wires themselves, but then there was little reason to expect a 40-foot-tall boat or a low-flying airplane to pass by here. However, a conspicuous 100-foot-wide clear-cut path marked the trail of the wires through the forest on both sides of the river. Because the pilot had flown over the power lines and touched down beyond them when he landed, it seemed unlikely that he had not been aware of them.

Telling Details

The National Transportation Safety Board confined its determination of the probable cause of the accident to “the pilot’s failure to see and avoid power lines while flying at low altitude.” That is exactly correct, but why did it happen?

The NTSB’s public docket on the accident supplies a few interesting details. The pilot and his friend were acquainted through the local hang-gliding community and Facebook. The friend described the pilot as “an icon in the community” and experienced, with 9,000 or 10,000 hours in light-sport aircraft.

Now, few people have that much time in light-sport aircraft because the category came into being only a few years ago. Of course, he could have just meant small, sporty aircraft. But while his logbook was not found, the pilot’s recent medical-certificate applications were. In 2014, he had reported 982 hours of flight experience. Two years later, he reported 8,000 hours. By the time the information reached his friend, his time had swelled even further.

• DON’T MISS OUT: Subscribe to FLYING Magazine

Now, exaggerating one’s flight experience is a venial sin—just so much harmless bragging.

What strikes one as odd about the story of the airborne search for the life jacket, however, is the disproportion between the means and the end. To get on a paddleboard and go downriver looking for a life preserver makes sense; to use an airplane for such a search does not. The paddler can scan the banks at leisure for the brightly colored object. At 70 mph, or whatever the searching speed of the Buccaneer might be, its pilot could not take his eyes off the shores for an instant. Maybe it would make sense if there were miles of river to search, but the life jacket was not long gone, and the Suwanee is not white water.

Questions Abound

The grandiosity of the pilot’s action might be of a piece with his exaggeration of his flight experience. It might come from a desire to show off, to impress, to arrest the attention of onlookers. If so, he would not be the first pilot so inclined.

So to begin with, there is a question of the pilot’s good judgment in deciding to conduct a search for a small object while flying below the treetops along a sinuous river—a river with which he was unfamiliar, and whose twists and turns he could not anticipate.

And then there is the question of situational awareness, or at least of memory. How could he forget the power lines that he had flown over half an hour earlier? Perhaps it’s significant that when he landed over the power lines in the first place, he did not expect to encounter them again; there was a bend in the river to the south, so he would certainly take off northward. Unconsciously, perhaps, he edited the power lines out of his memory as something already over and done with, and then failed to retrieve the memory of them when, on an unexpected new mission, he turned back southward after taking off.

Why did he not see the wires as he approached them? According to witnesses, the sky was gray and overcast at the time, and they were hard to see. Near eye level, they may have blended into the background of foliage. Perhaps the anticipation of soaring triumphantly over his paddling friend’s head distracted the pilot. And he may have been looking sideways and down, not up or straight ahead.

Flying at low altitude is enjoyable, but it is also dangerous. Part of the danger is that you will fail to notice an obstruction; part is that you are turning over some of the control of your flight path to the whims of the terrain. But the most serious danger is that, if you make a mistake, you will have very little time or space in which to correct it.

No Room for Error

In a similar accident that occurred just nine months after this one, a Cessna 172 collided with power lines 40 feet above the Mississippi River near Ramsey, Minnesota. The 300-hour pilot, 47, most probably failed to see the power lines—although they were marked by red balls—because he was coming around a bend in the river and facing the evening sun.

The NTSB included the pilot’s “personality” among the causes of the accident. He was known to be a person who could not resist the impulse to do reckless things and brag about them later. His instructor urged him to cool it and, at one point, sardonically suggested that if he intended to die in an airplane crash, he should at least not take his wife and son with him.

He took only his wife.

Editor’s Note: This article is based on the NTSB reports of these accidents and is intended to bring the issues raised to our readers’ attention.

This article originally appeared in the December 2021 issue of FLYING.

The post Trouble Flying Low Upon the Suwanee River appeared first on FLYING Magazine.